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 Medical Malpractice
 Treating the Causes Instead of the Symptoms
 DAVID ORENTLICHER, MD, JD
 The 2 reports on medical malpractice in this
 month's issue deliver 2 messages.1'2 In their study
 linking negligent care and malpractice claims,'
 Studdert et al found that for all of the academic
 debate and legislative activity in the past 20 years,
 some things have not changed very much with
 medical malpractice and the law. Eighteen years
 after landmark Califoria data and 8 years after
 equally important New York data, malpractice
 occurrence and malpractice claims data from Col-
 orado and Utah in 1992 paint essentially the same
 picture as the earlier results: a small percentage of
 injured patients actually sue, and when claims are
 brought, a high percentage of them do not involve
 malpractice. In other words, the tort system in-
 cludes many false-positives (patients who sue in
 the absence of negligence) and even more false-
 negatives (patients who do not sue despite having
 been harmed by negligence).3 As a result, the law
 often subjects the wrong physicians to legal pro-
 cess, it generally does not hold physicians ac-
 countable for their negligence, and it fails to
 ensure adequate compensation for injured pa-
 tients.l
 See p 250 and p 261
 In contrast, Thomas et al,2 from the same group
 of researchers, suggest considerable progress in
 the second study in this issue. Although the
 likelihood of negligent care appears to have been
 fairly stable over time, ranging from 0.79% of
 hospitalized patients in 1974 (California) to 1.00%
 of hospitalized patients in 1984 (New York) to
 0.90% and 0.80% of hospitalized patients in 1992
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(Utah and Colorado; see Table 2 in Reference 1),
 he likelihood of death from negligent care may
 have declined substantially. In Califoria in 1974
 and New York in 1984, 1 in 4 negligent events
 resulted in death (Reference 2 and Table 2.2 in
 Reference 4); in Colorado and Utah in 1992, 1 in 11
 negligent events led to the patient's death.2
 If the data on patient mortality were the only
 evidence of progress in malpractice, we could not
 be confident in drawing conclusions. The better
 results over time could simply reflect regional
 variation or empirical inaccuracy. The researchers
 have been cautious about the significance of their
 mortality data,2 and readers should also be careful
 not to put too much stock in the exact magnitude
 of the numbers from 1992 or earlier. Extrapolations
 from the New York study yielded an estimate of
 180,000 deaths each year in the United States from
 all kinds of iatrogenic injury, whereas a similar
 extrapolation of the Colorado and Utah study
 suggests 65,000 deaths a year.2 (Extrapolating the
 California data would yield an estimate of 150,000
 deaths a year.4(PP2o,22))
 Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to conclude
 that little improvement has occurred. Recent shifts
 in public policy suggest that we are witnessing a
 welcome sea change in society's response to prob-
 lems in medical malpractice.
 Public policy used to emphasize reforms that
 would protect physicians from the vagaries of the
 legal system.5 Led by California and Indiana, state
 legislatures capped the amount of money that
 patients could recover for their injuries, required
 patients to bring their lawsuits within 2 or 3 years
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 after suffering harm, and forced patients to file
 their claims with medical review panels before
 pursuing their claims in court.6
 Public policy today emphasizes reforms that
 will protect patients from the vagaries of the
 health care system. Indeed, in the final weeks of
 1999, after the release of an Institute of Medicine
 report on medical negligence,7'8 President Clin-
 ton,9 health care organizations,10 and large em-
 ployers10 called for major efforts to reduce the
 incidence of medical malpractice.
 The focus is where it should be: on the causes
 rather than the symptoms of negligence by phy-
 sicians. Experts in malpractice are drawing on
 lessons from other industries to implement
 changes in health care that will prevent unneces-
 sary harms. For example, attention to system-wide
 defects instead of to the practices of individual
 practitioners has led to important changes.2,1
 Computer programs now flag dangerous interac-
 tions among different drugs taken by a patient,
 and they identify situations when the planned
 dose seems inappropriately high.12 Having physi-
 cians type, rather than write, their prescriptions
 reduces the likelihood that the pharmacy will
 deliver the wrong drug to the patient. Systems
 reforms also include procedures to prevent physi-
 cians from operating on the wrong patient or the
 wrong part of the body.
 The change in focus is a welcome shift from
 unproductive and unfair criticisms of patients and
 their attorneys. Although it is likely true that most
 lawsuits are filed in the absence of negligence,1,"3
 that fact probably reflects the relatively low rate of
 negligence, not the arbitrariness of personal injury
 lawyers.5 The following example will illustrate.
 Probably no more than 1 in 10 people who come
 to a lawyer because of suspected malpractice are
 actually harmed by negligent care (personal com-
 munication with Michael S. Miller, JD, Miller,
 Muller, Mendelson & Kennedy, Indianapolis, Ind,
 January 4, 2000). If lawyers are accurate 90% of the
 time in distinguishing cases of negligence from
 cases in which negligence was not involved (ie,
 90% sensitivity and 90% specificity), then half of
 all malpractice suits will be based on cases in
 which no negligence took place.
 The critical change in focus from the symptoms to
 the causes of malpractice could not have occurred
 without research like that presented in this issue.1,2
 During the 1970s and 1980s, most people shared the
 perception that ambulance-chasing lawyers and liti-
 gious patients were harassing competent and careful
 physicians, thereby pushing insurance premiums to
 unaffordable levels and driving doctors out of high-
 risk specialties like obstetrics and gynecology. In the
 popular view, problems in malpractice would be
 solved if it became more difficult for patients to sue
 their physicians.
 As the data accumulated, however, it became clear
 what the Colorado and Utah experiences confirm:
 patients and their lawyers are not too likely to sue; if
 anything, they are too unlikely to sue. When physi-
 cians face only a few percent chance of being
 charged with malpractice,1,14 they may not be ade-
 quately deterred from negligence. In addition, pa-
 tients are not being adequately compensated for
 their injuries if only 2% or 3% of them bring claims.
 And, as the studies demonstrate, many patients who
 have the greatest need for compensation-the indi-
 gent-are the least likely to sue.1,15
 With better data, then, it became clear that the
 problem with malpractice was not in its litigation.
 The primary need is to reduce the frequency of
 malpractice, not to reduce the frequency of law-
 suits. Although different studies have yielded dif-
 ferent rates of negligence and different rates of
 mortality from negligence,2'7 they all indicate that
 medical malpractice is a leading cause of illness
 and death in the United States.7
 Important advances have already occurred in
 the medical profession's efforts to prevent the
 occurrence of malpractice. As mentioned, proce-
 dures have been implemented to reduce adverse
 events from the use of prescription drugs. In
 addition, the development of specific and detailed
 standards for patient monitoring during surgery
 has apparently contributed to reductions in the
 number of severe injuries from the maladministra-
 tion of general anesthesia.16 There is, then, good
 reason to conclude that the improvements in data
 are at least in part real.
 We might also consider whether some of the
 improvement reflects greater efforts at cost contain-
 ment. As insurers have restricted reimbursement,
 hospitalization rates have declined, and patients are
 being discharged more quickly. Fewer admissions
 and fewer days once admitted mean fewer opportu-
 nities for iatrogenic injury. If physicians reduce un-
 necessary admissions, for example, patients are
 spared unnecessary procedures. To be sure, cutbacks
 on hospital care may jeopardize patient care, but the
 studies in this issue took into account negligent care
 that occurred before the patient's admission to the
 hospital,2 and other studies do not provide much
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 support for the view that cost containment has
 worsened the quality of care.17
 Where do we go from here? Continued focus on
 preventing malpractice is the most important pol-
 icy. Patient welfare is the ultimate goal, and the
 interests of patients and physicians alike will be
 best served if patients escape harm. One of the
 studies in this issue demonstrates again the areas
 where the most harm occurs from negligence:
 surgery and other procedures, drug administra-
 tion, and faulty diagnoses by primary care provid-
 ers.2 Preventive measures should emphasize those
 areas, as they already have to a large extent.
 As to additional reforms of tort law, it is difficult to
 be optimistic. The most promising reforms, those
 that would ensure better compensation of injured
 patients, have commanded little political support.1
 Alternative reforms, those that would further impede
 patient access to the courts, may be more popular in
 state legislatures. However, they would only exacer-
 bate the existing problems of physicians receiving
 weak signals of deterrence from the legal system and
 patients having trouble recovering compensation for
 their injuries. Diluting the deterrence of tort law
 would be especially troublesome in the current era of
 managed care. When physicians practiced under
 fee-for-service reimbursement, tort liability arguably
 aggravated the financial incentive to provide too
 much care by inducing defensive medicine. Under
 managed care, financial incentives encourage physi-
 cians to provide too little care, so tort liability can
 help ensure that physicians do not respond to their
 financial incentives by withholding necessary treat-
 ment.18
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